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Abstract
Shortest path network interdiction is a combinatorial optimiza-
tion problem on an activity network arising in a number of im-
portant security-related applications. It is classically formulated
as a bilevel maximin problem representing an “interdictor” and
an “evader”. The evader tries to move from a source node to the
target node along a path of the least cost while the interdictor
attempts to frustrate this motion by cutting edges or nodes. The
interdiction objective is to find the optimal set of edges to cut
given that there is a finite interdiction budget and the interdic-
tor must move first. We reformulate the interdiction problem for
stochastic evaders by introducing a model in which the evader
follows a Markovian random walk guided by the least-cost path
to the target. This model can represent incomplete knowledge
about the evader, and the resulting model is a nonlinear 0−1 op-
timization problem. We then introduce an optimization heuris-
tic based on betweenness centrality that can rapidly find high-
quality interdiction solutions by providing a global view of the
network. keyword: Network Interdiction; Stochastic Optimiza-
tion; Guided Random Walk; Betweenness Centrality; LA-UR-
08-06551
1 Introduction
Mathematical modeling of network interdiction origi-
nated in the study of military supply chains and inter-
diction of transportation networks [11, 17]. The prob-
lem is currently studied in different classes of networks
and in a variety of contexts, and finds applications in
countering of nuclear proliferation programs [19], con-
trol of infectious diseases [23], and disruption of terrorist
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networks [18]. The underlying networks may represent
transportation networks, as well as social or activity net-
works. Recent interest in the problem has been in part
due to the threat of smuggling of nuclear materials and
devices [21]. Interdiction corresponds to the installation
of special radiation-sensitive detectors across transporta-
tion links.
The problem is often posed in terms of two agents
called “interdictor” and “evader” where the evader at-
tempts to minimize some objective function in the net-
work, e.g. distance, cost, or risk when traveling from net-
work location s to location t, while the interdictor attempts
to limit success by removing network nodes or edges. The
interdictor has limited resources and can thus only remove
a finite set of nodes or edges. In the simplest formulation,
the interdictor seeks to identify a set of edges (or nodes)
on the network whose removal maximizes the cost of the
least-cost path from a source to a destination node, while
the evader seeks to find and traverse the best unimpeded
path. This interdiction problem is known as the “most vi-
tal edges” (or “most vital nodes”) problem [8] and it has
been shown to be NP-hard [3] and NP-hard to approxi-
mate to better than a factor of 2 [6]. Methods for solving
network interdiction problems have included exact algo-
rithms for solving integer programs, such as branch-and-
bound, as well as decomposition methods to rebuild the
network by iteratively adding relevant paths to reduce the
size of both the underlying network and the number of bi-
nary decision variables. A more recent approach, based
on structure-dependent cutting planes, exploits the rela-
tionship between the ordered set of evasion paths and bi-
nary interdiction variables [22].
A common assumption in many studies is that there is
perfect knowledge of hard-to-compute network parame-
ters, such as the cost to the evader to traverse an edge in
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terms of resource consumption or probability of detection.
However, it is clear that the evader, and, to a lesser extent,
the interdictor, have unreliable and incomplete informa-
tion about the network. These uncertainties place the in-
terdiction problem within stochastic optimization, where
one seeks to find those edges that are vital on average.
Indeed, under uncertainty the evader must be described
in probabilistic terms. By constructing such probabilis-
tic evader models one can expect to develop more robust
interdiction solutions. The problem of stochastic inter-
diction has been the focus of a number of recent stud-
ies [19, 1, 5, 16, 24, 13, 9].
Failure to account for evader uncertainty can lead to
suboptimal decisions, namely, solutions that do not max-
imize (and even decrease) the evader’s expected cost to
reach the target. Consider for instance the network in
Fig. 1. There are four paths from the source to the tar-
get: one each through nodes 1,2,3 and the one direct path
(0,5) with costs 9,8,8 and 8.01, respectively. If only one
edge can be removed, the solution in the least-path-cost
formulation is to remove edge (4,5) which increases the
path cost from 8.0 to 8.01. However if the evader is un-
able to determine which path has the least cost and takes
any path with equal (or nearly equal) probability, then this
solution is not optimal. Interdiction at (4,5) actually de-
creases the expected cost from ≈ 8.25 to 8.01, because
it removes the costly path through node 1. The optimal
choice is interdiction of any one of the edges (0,2), (2,4),
(0,3), or (3,4), which increases the expected cost from
≈ 8.25 to ≈ 8.33.
In this paper we describe a Markovian network inter-
diction framework which can capture a wide range of net-
work evader behavior (Sec. 2). We then demonstrate the
general framework with a simple model based on evader
decision-making mechanisms (Sec. 4). Finally we de-
velop efficient heuristic algorithms for the interdiction
problem based on the structure of the graph and then
present performance results comparing various heuristic
methods (Sec. 5).
2 The interdiction model
Our interdiction formulation is a stochastic generaliza-
tion of the max-min shortest path interdiction problem
(termed the “least-cost path” interdiction problem, to be
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Fig. 1: Example network where the shortest path inter-
diction formulation produces a suboptimal solu-
tion when interdicting a single edge. Interdict-
ing that edge (4,5) decreases the expected path
cost. Interdicting any one of (0,2), (2,4),(0,3),
or (3,4) increases the expected path cost.
exact) [11, 17, 15]. In the least-cost path formulation an
evader attempts to traverse a network on a path from an
origin s to a destination t. Let p be some path between
s and t in a graph G(N,A) with the set of nodes N and
the set of weighted edges A. Let c(p) be the path cost
computed by summing the costCi j over the edges (i, j) of
p, and any self-looped edge has zero cost, Cii = 0 . The
edge costs are assumed to be given in the problem and
may depend on direction (in the case that G(N,A) is a di-
rected graph). Here “edge cost” is used interchangeably
with “edge weight”.
The network interdiction strategy is represented by an
interdiction set R which is a subset of the edge set A of
b (budget). The decision variable ri j is set to 1 if edge
(i, j) ∈R, i.e. (i, j) is interdicted, and ri j = 0 otherwise.
Interdiction increases the cost of traversing (i, j) by a con-
stant Di j ≥ 0. When the value of Di j is very large all paths
avoid the interdicted edge (i, j) (assuming that there is an
alternative path) which effectively removes the edge (i, j)
from the graph. One may write C′i j =Ci j+ ri jDi j but it is
more convenient to use Ci j at all times to denote cost that
includes possible interdiction. This makes the matrix C a
function of r.
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In the shortest path model, the evader only travels on
paths of lowest cost, and is fully aware of increases in
edge costs caused by interdiction decisions. This gives
the optimization problem
max
r∈R
min
p∈PT
c(p) , (1)
where c(p) is implicitly a function of r, and PT is the set
of paths from s to t. The above formulation is for inter-
diction of edges but of course, a similar problem could
be considered for node interdiction (by introducing for all
i ∈ N node costs Di and decision variables on nodes ri.)
A stochastic version of the interdiction problem can be
constructed by supposing that an evader may take any
path from s to t, according to some probability distribu-
tion, rather than always choosing a least-cost path. Ran-
domness in the evader path decision is due to the lack of
knowledge of how the evader travels through the network.
It is fundamentally caused by his uncertainty about inter-
diction decisions r or network costs, mistaken cost com-
putations, or possibly even by intent to increase unpre-
dictability. Suppose the evader selects path p with prob-
ability P(p). His expected cost of traveling from s to t is
then
E[c] = ∑
p∈PT
P(p)c(p) . (2)
The interdiction problem becomes
max
r∈R ∑p∈PT
P(p|r)cr(p) , (3)
where P(p|r) is now the probability of traversing a path
given the interdiction set r. The conditional probabil-
ity P(p|r) implicitly contains the evader’s strategy. The
shortest-path optimization problem (1) is clearly just a
special instance of (3) when the expectation is conditioned
on traversal of only least-cost paths.
To compute the expected cost E[c], we rewrite it in
terms of the edge costs and the number of visits to each
edge. If Fi j is the expected number of visits of edge (i, j)
by an evader, then
Lemma 1.
E[c] = ∑
p∈PT
P(p)c(p) = ∑
(i, j)∈A
Ci jFi j. (4)
Proof. By definition Fi j = ∑p∈PT :(i, j)∈pP(p), and Fi j can
in general be larger than 1 because paths may revisit (i, j).
The equivalency follows as
E[c] = ∑
p∈PT
P(p)c(p) ,
= ∑
p∈PT
P(p) ∑
(i, j)∈p
Ci j ,
= ∑
(i, j)∈A
Ci j ∑
p∈PT :(i, j)∈p
P(p) ,
= ∑
(i, j)∈A
Ci jFi j.
The expected cost E[c] is now expressed through the
expected number of visits to all edges (the Fi j values). The
latter quantity may be hard to compute in general because
every evader path could in principle visit edge (i, j), while
the number of possible paths can be very large and even
unbounded. Fortunately, one particular class of stochastic
models - Markov chains - gives a closed-form expression
for Fi j.
3 Markovian evaders
We model the stochastic evader as a Markov chain that
has its states at the nodes of the network. In the most
general case, the chain is completely described by (1) a
distribution of starting nodes, a, and (2) a Markovian tran-
sition probability matrix, M. In the next section, we will
provide derivations of M for some realistic applications
by examining the decision-making mechanisms of a ra-
tional evader frustrated by uncertain information. Such
an evader makes transitions that tend to bring him closer
to his target.
Consider for now the most general case. The motion
of the evader is just a Markov chain with an absorbing
state at the target node t. An element Mi j of his transition
probability matrix is the probability of motion from node
i to node j along edge (i, j). The matrix M must satisfy
two conditions (1) Absorption at t: Mtt = 1 and Mti = 0
for all i 6= t, and (2) Access to t: from any starting state
i 6= t there is a positive probability of reaching state t in
a finite number of transitions. Because of condition (1)
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the transition matrix of an absorbing Markov chain can be
arranged into the following canonical form
M=
(
Mˆ R
0 1
)
.
Here the matrix Mˆ (n−1 by n−1) contains the transition
probabilities among transient states. The matrix R (n−
1 by 1) specifies the probabilities of transition from the
transient states to the absorbing state.
Similarly, the edge cost matrix for an absorbing Marko-
vian evader takes a specific form
C=
(
Cˆ S
Z 0
)
.
Here the matrix Cˆ (n− 1 by n− 1) contains the costs for
transition among transient states. The matrix S (n− 1 by
1) specifies the costs for moving to the absorbing state,
whileZ (1 by n−1) are cost for edges out of the absorbing
states - those edges are never traversed. The elementCtt =
0 implies that there is no cost to remain at the target node
t.
Based on the matrix Mˆ one constructs the Fundamental
Matrix N of the chain:
N= (I−Mˆ)−1
.
Theorem 1. Element Ni j of the fundamental matrix gives
the expected number of visits to state j if starting at state
i (Theorem 11.4 in [12].)
In general the starting state of the evader is given by
a distribution a over the nodes. For convenience, the
absorbing node t is excluded from a, which is n− 1-
dimensional. The expected number of visits to (i, j) be-
fore absorption at t is
Corollary 1.
Fi j = [aN]iMi j. (5)
The expected cost E[c] for a Markovian evader can be
found by substituting (5) into (4) [25],
Theorem 2.
E[c] = aNdiag
[
MˆCˆT+RST
]
, (6)
where diag
[
MˆCˆT+RST
]
denotes the column vector of
the diagonal elements of matrix MˆCˆT+RST.
In a special case where the edge cost is always 1, i.e.
Ci j = 1, ∀(i, j) ∈ A, E[c] in (6) reduces to the well-known
expression for expected time-to-absorption: aNe.
The objective in the Markovian network interdiction
problem is to maximize E[c]. In the interdiction model,
edge cost depends on the interdiction variable r. In turn,
the transition matrix and the fundamental matrix depend
on r too. Therefore, this results in the nonlinear optimiza-
tion problem
max
r∈R
aNdiag
[
MˆCˆT+RST
]
. (7)
This optimization problem could be termed the Single
Markovian Evader Network Interdiction problem. The
distribution of starting nodes is assumed to be given and
independent of the interdiction strategy r, while the M
matrix is assumed to be determined as soon as the graph
and r are known. In numerical computations the most
computationally demanding part resides in finding aN =
a(I− Mˆ)−1, which require Gaussian elimination in gen-
eral.
The problem in (7) can be generalized for the case of
multiple evaders where each evader represents a threat
scenario or an adversarial group. Each evader k then has
certain probability w(k) of occurring (∑kw(k)= 1), as well
as a distinctive source distribution a(k), target node t(k)
and transition matrix M(k). The generalized objective is a
weighted sum of Eq. (6) over all evaders.
4 Evader models
As was noted in the introduction the evader may often
be unable to determine correctly the least-cost path to
the target because of incomplete and inaccurate informa-
tion about the network topology, interdiction decisions, or
costs along alternative paths. We now develop a concrete
Markovian model that incorporates uncertainty in the path
of the evader. These types of models have analogues in
other contexts. For example, a similar model was devel-
oped for routing in ad-hoc wireless networks. In that ap-
plication the objective is to transmit messages through the
network with short delivery leg and balanced load [4].
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4.1 The least-cost-guided evader
We suppose that at each node i the evader will consider
several paths from i to t and select the one that appears
to have the lowest cost. Putting this in the content of a
Markovian model, we define pi be the least cost path from
i to t, with cost denoted by c(pi). Suppose the evader has
a destination t and node j is any node in the neighborhood
of i ( j ∈ Gi). The transition probability from i to j is
Mi j =
e−λ(c(pi)−Ci j−c(p j))
∑ j∈Gi e
−λ(c(pi)−Ci j−c(p j))
, (8)
where λ ≥ 0 is a parameter (see Fig. 2.)
t
s
j
i
Ci j + c(p j) = 4
c(pi) = 3
Fig. 2: Computation of the transition probabilities Mi j.
The least-cost path from node i to the target t is the
path pi (thick red) with cost c(pi) = 3. Through
node j the shortest path to t is (thin blue) path pi
with cost Ci j+ c(p j) = 4.
The adherence to the least-cost path is determined by
the parameter λ . When λ → ∞ the evader moves deter-
ministically along the least-cost path (or paths) and when
λ → 0 the motion is perfectly random. The least-cost path
has the highest probability, but the difference with other
paths vanishes as λ → 0. Hence, the model can be called
the “least-cost-guided evader”.
Notice that although Mi j values in Eq. (8) depend on the
cost of least-cost path, when λ < ∞ this dependence is a
smooth function of path costs. Thus the new formulation
provides a more desirable description of evader motion
because it avoids the sensitivity to path costs seen in the
shortest-path evader model. The process of computing the
probabilities involves running Dijkstra’s algorithm to find
the distance to the target node from each node i, which
gives c(pi).
4.2 The least-risk-guided evader
In some applications the evader may base decisions on
the risk of crossing an edge rather than the cost. In those
cases the each edge in the network is assigned a value Yi j
for the probability of successful evasion, instead of a cost
Ci j . The evader attempts to find the path to the target t
that offers the greatest probability of evasion which is is
just the product of those Yi j values along the path.
Let qi j be the probability of successful evasion on a
path consisting of the edge (i, j) and then of the least-
risk path from j to the target. One choice is to assume
that an evader would traverse edge (i, j) with probability
proportional to qi j, or more generally, proportional to a
positive power of qi j
Mi j ∝
(
qi j
qi∗
)λ
, (9)
where λ > 0 is a parameter, qi∗ = max j qi j is the proba-
bility of evasion if the least-risk path from i to the target
is followed (the constant of proportionality is found from
∑ jMi j = 1.)
4.3 The non-retreating evader
A simple variant the least-cost-guided model is the non-
retreating evader. In this model it is assumed that an
evader always moves to nodes that are closer to the tar-
get node t than the current node. To represent this model
assume that there is zero probability of motion through
(i, j) if node i is at least as close to the target as node
j, namely, c(pi) ≤ c(p j), where c(pi) and c(p j) are the
smallest costs of paths to the target from nodes i and j,
respectively, computed by summing the edge weights.
An interesting effect of this assumption is that the
evader evader would never cross a node or an edge twice.
Consequently the set of nodes becomes a partially ordered
set and as a result, there exists a relabeling σ of the nodes
such that if c(pi) > c(p j) then σ(i) > σ( j). A simple
5 Solving the Markovian interdiction problem 6
(non-unique) procedure is to label the target node t as 0
(σ(t) = 0) and then rank the nodes in the order of their
distance (cost) along least-cost path to t, breaking ties ar-
bitrarily. Computationally, this is the same as the order
the nodes are reached by a shortest path (Dijkstra’s) algo-
rithm starting at t. The transition probability becomes
Mˆi j =
{
Mi j , c(pi)> c(p j) ,
0 , c(pi)≤ c(p j) .
In this case all paths must reach the target after at most
|N| − 1 steps, where |N| is the number nodes in G, and
hence Mˆ becomes nilpotent of power |N|−1. Moreover,
by labeling the nodes up in order of increasing cost, Mˆ can
be written as a lower-triangular matrix with zero diagonal.
For example, if the evader traverses a 2× 3 grid with the
target at one corner then one possible σ gives the matrix
Mˆ=

0
1 0
1 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0.5 0.5 0 0
0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0
 .
The special matrix structure facilitates an order-of mag-
nitude speedup in the computation of Eq. 6. For a gen-
eral M, computing a(I−M)−1 involves Gaussian elim-
ination at a cost of 2|N|3/3 operations. For a nilpotent
lower-triangular Mˆ the cost falls to O(|N|2) since we can
use backward-forward substitutions instead of Gaussian
elimination. The cost of computing the objective func-
tion Eq. (6) is also expected to drop to O(|N|2) despite
the need to reorder the matrix C when the nodes are rela-
beled.
5 Solving the Markovian interdiction
problem
The challenge of network interdiction consists of devel-
oping both realistic models and tractable algorithms. The
Markovian evader model adds realism but does not reduce
the computational complexity of finding good interdiction
solutions. Indeed it is clear that the Markovian model is
computationally hard because in the limit of λ → ∞, the
model becomes the least-cost interdiction problem which
is NP-Hard [2, 3] and also hard to approximate [6]. There-
fore, this section discusses solution heuristics based on
network structure.
A common approach to solving many combinatorial
optimization problems is based on local, or neighborhood,
search algorithms such as simulated annealing [20]. But
those general-purpose local search algorithms do not scale
well to larger problems or find poor solutions. The solu-
tion space may be exponential in the budget so any itera-
tive improvement process of local search can only explore
a very small fraction of solutions in a polynomial number
of steps. It follows that high-quality solutions can only
come from more specialized solvers that exploit the struc-
ture of the interdiction problem. We explore algorithms
based on ranking functions that rank edges according to
global information about graph structure.
5.1 Betweenness centrality heuristic
The most successful ranking function we found is de-
rived from the shortest-path betweenness centrality. The
shortest-path betweenness centrality of an edge is the
fraction of least-cost paths between all pairs of nodes in
a network that cross the edge [10]. This metric identifies
those edges that are critical to connectivity within a net-
work, such as bridge edges that joins two graph compo-
nents, because they participate in a large number of least-
cost paths linking nodes on a network,
We constructed an heuristic based on shortest-path be-
tweenness centrality by considering only paths between
the sources a and the target t of the evader. Recall that
as is the probability that the evader would start at node
s. Let σst,R be the number of least-cost paths between
nodes s and the target node t in the graph with interdic-
tion set R. Similarly, let σst,R(e) be the number of those
paths that pass through edge e. Therefore, we define the
source-weighted centrality of edge e with respect to t as
the sum
HR(e) = ∑
s:t 6=s∈V
as
σst,R(e)
σst,R
. (10)
Notice that this quantity needs to be re-computed during
execution of an interdiction problem: as the interdiction
set R is increased, the costs of the edges change and so
are the least-cost paths. An algorithm for calculating a
metric of this kind for all e∈A in O(|A|+ |N| log |N|) time
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is found in Ref. [7]. In the case of multiple evaders, the
heuristic is computed for each evader and weighted based
on w(k).
5.2 Algorithms
We use the betweenness heuristic HR(e) to rank the edges
e in the network given the interdiction set R. This
heuristic leads to a simple algorithm, termed Betweenness
(Alg. 1), that performs a sequential selection of edges.
The betweenness algorithm is fast since it does not eval-
Algorithm 1 Betweenness algorithm using global heuris-
tic H for budget B
R←∅
while B> 0 do
R←R ∪{argmaxe∈ArRHR(e)}, resolving ties ar-
bitrarily.
B← B−1
Output(R)
uate the objective function but only has to initially com-
pute the ranking heuristic and then re-evaluate it after the
interdicted edge is chosen. The heuristic is called B times:
once for each of the budgeted edges.
For comparison we also use a more computational ex-
pensive greedy algorithm (Alg. 2) that constructs the in-
terdiction setR incrementally. At each of the B steps, the
greedy algorithm computes ∆R(e), the increase in the ob-
jective function due to addition of edge e and then selects
the best edge.
Algorithm 2 Greedy algorithm for the construction of the
interdiction setR with budget B
R←∅
while B> 0 do
for all e ∈ A do
∆R(e) := h(R ∪{e})−h(R)
R ← R ∪ {argmaxe∈A∆R(e)}, resolving ties arbi-
trarily.
B← B−1
Output(R)
5.3 Performance results
We now demonstrate the performance of the Greedy and
Betweenness algorithms on a sample network interdic-
tion problem and show the effect of varying the random-
ness parameter λ . We used a network which consists of
a 10× 10 grid of directed edges with 10 added short-
cuts between random pairs of nodes for a total of 420
edges. Weights were assigned to each edge by choosing
uniformly at random from the interval [0.5, 1.5]. We se-
lected 2 distinct targets at random (i.e. 2 evaders) each
with 5 source locations.
10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1 100 101 102 103 104
λ
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
co
st
Fig. 3: The expected cost of reaching the target from the
source a function of the parameter λ for an ex-
ample network. For large values of λ the model
chooses only the shortest path and the expected
cost is lowest. As λ decreases the cost increases
as the paths become more random. For λ = 0
the paths are completely random and the cost is
at the maximum. The expected cost is calcu-
lated by Eq. (6) with the evader model M given
by Eq. (8). The network is a 10× 10 directed
grid with 10 randomly added shortcut edges and
the target and source are chosen randomly. Each
of the edges have weights chosen uniformly from
[0.5,1.5]. The marked points will be used in per-
formance evaluations, presented in Fig. 4.
The motion of the evader followed the least-cost-
guided model. In this model, the effect of the parameter
λ on the expected cost for the evader (before interdiction)
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is not linear, as shown in Fig. 3. At low values of λ the
motion is random and the cost is the highest. As λ is in-
creased the evader follows paths that are closer to the op-
timal path and the cost decreases continuously toward the
minimum achievable at large λ . The transition between
the cost of random motion and the optimal cost occurs
rapidly over a small range of λ where the most diverse be-
havior is found. This transition in behavior was observed
in other random and structured graphs and real-world net-
works that we examined and is a feature of the nonlinear
dependence of the path probabilities from Eq. (8).
Fig. 4 shows characteristic performance results for both
the Greedy and Betweenness algorithms for various λ .
The performance is measured in terms of the expected
cost given by Eq. (6). Interdiction of an edge causes the
weight of the edge to increase by a fixed value Di j. We set
the added increase to be half the diameter of the network
which in this case is Di j = 4.5.
For small budgets the Betweenness algorithm and
Greedy algorithm produce comparable results as mea-
sured by the increase in cost for all λ values. The Be-
tweenness algorithm is considerably cheaper in computa-
tional cost. As the budget is increased the Betweenness
heuristic performs very well for larger λ . But for smaller
λ , as the evader randomness increases, the algorithm per-
formance difference diverges indicating that the Between-
ness heuristic is no longer effective. At very low values
of λ the evader motion is random and no algorithm is ex-
pected to be effective.
A particularly interesting phenomenon is the non-
monotonicity of the expected cost. Namely, for some
low λ values the expected cost E(c) sometimes actually
decreases after the interdiction set is enlarged. This ef-
fect was anticipated by the example in Fig. 1 and it oc-
curs because the behavior of the randomizing evader is
fundamentally different from the behavior of the max-
min evader. If we relax the budget constraint |R| = B
to |R| ≤ B, the objective will be nondecreasing in the
Greedy algorithm.
Other realizations of 10× 10 grid networks produce
similar results and are not shown here. In addition to this
example we have explored the performance of the algo-
rithms on other networks including real-world of trans-
portation networks, such as the Washington DC trans-
portation transit time network and the Rome city road
network [14]. The computation cost of the Greedy al-
gorithm becomes prohibitive in these and other urban,
national and international transportation systems. Those
networks have 103 − 107 edges, depending on the spa-
tial resolution. The Greedy algorithm running time scales
as O(|A||N|3) for the least-cost-guided evader model,
while the Betweenness algorithm remains feasible even
on very large instances because its running time scales as
O(|A|+ |N| log |N|).
6 Conclusions and outlook
Practical instances of network interdiction must invari-
ably address the uncertainty in the network structure and
evader behavior. Such behavior can be modeled using
the proposed Markov chain approach, which achieves in-
creased realism while remaining analytically penetrable.
To summarize, the main contribution of this work are:
• a demonstration of the fundamental advantages of
stochastic models over least-cost models,
• a stochastic model of the evader motion based on a
Markovian guided random walk, and
• a scalable interdiction algorithm based on a special-
ized betweenness centrality function.
Future research must address both computational and
modeling challenges in stochastic network interdiction.
Current algorithms are effective in the case where the
evader motion is partially predictable. It is not known
whether more specialized heuristics can be more success-
ful in the case of highly-stochastic adversaries. In the cur-
rent model the randomness comes only from information
constraints. In some problems computational constraints
on the evader also play a role in determining his motion.
Models that account for both kinds of constrains promise
further gains in realism and would expand the range of
applications where network interdiction could be used.
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Fig. 4: Comparison of the Greedy (2) and Betweenness (1) algorithms for given budgets on the sample grid network
described in Fig. 3. Four different values of λ are shown corresponding to different levels of randomness
in the evader path selection. When the randomness of the evader is low (high λ ) the Betweenness algorithm
performs very well compared to the higher computational cost Greedy algorithm. As the randomness increases
the algorithms’ performance diverges after very small budgets - demonstrating that the Betweenness heuristic
is no longer effective. At low values of λ the evader motion is random and no algorithm will be effective. The
convergence of the algorithms at large budgets occurs because we do not allow an edge to be interdicted more
than once and at that budget every edge in the graph is interdicted and the costs are the same.
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